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A framework for synthesis of safety justification
for digitally enabled healthcare services
George Despotou1, Mark Ryan2, Theodoros N Arvanitis1, Andrew J Rae3,
Sean White4, Tim Kelly5 and Richard W Jones6
Abstract
Background: Digitally enabled healthcare services combine socio-technical resources to deliver the required outcomes to
patients. Unintended operation of these services may result in adverse effects to the patient. Eliminating avoidable
harm requires a systematic way of analysing the causal conditions, identifying opportunities for intervention. Operators
of such services may be required to justify, and communicate, their safety. For example, the UK Standardisation
Committee for Care Information (SCCI) standards 0129 and 0160 require a safety justification for health IT (superseded
versions were known as the Information Standards Board (ISB) 0129 & 0160. Initial as well as current standards are
maintained by the NHS Digital.
Method: A framework was designed, and applied as proof of concept, to an IT-supported clinical emergencies (A&E) service.
Evaluation was done qualitatively based on the authors’ experience, identifying potential benefits of the approach.
Results: The applied framework encapsulates analysis, and structures the generated information, into a skeleton of an
evidence-based case for safety. The framework improved management of the safety activities, assigning ownership to
stakeholders (e.g. IT developer), also creating a clear and compelling safety justification.
Conclusions: Application of the framework significantly contributed to systematising an exploratory approach for analysing
the service, in addition to existing methods such as reporting. Its application made the causal chain to harm more
diaphanous. Constructing a safety case contributed to: (a) identifying potential assurance gaps, (b) planning production
of information and evidence, and (c) communication of the justification by graphical unambiguous means.
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Introduction
A patient’s journey through the healthcare system may
entail many stages (e.g. preventive, acute, and post-
treatment). During all these stages, stakeholders (e.g.
doctors, surgeons, general practitioners, nurses,
patients), IT systems (e.g. electronic patient records,
clinical patient management systems), procedures,
drugs and medical devices all collaborate in creating a
system implementing patient-centred healthcare ser-
vices. Furthermore, advances in digital technology
have resulted in services incorporating innovative
approaches for healthcare. For example, interconnec-
tivity of Electronic Health Records has contributed
towards seamless and complete patient records, the
use of mobile applications has incorporated the patient
more actively into the services, and computer-based
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clinical decision support systems mine streams of data,
oﬀering early warning of potential issues with patients.
The resultant services are not randomly assembled, but
are designed in order to exhibit certain qualities, one of
which is safety. They are dynamically adapting systems
demonstrating variability during operation, which
stems out of the need for staﬀ to address tensions
appearing during operation.1 Healthcare services
often diverge from intended operation, potentially
resulting in harm to patients.a Failure of a service to
deliver the intended service may result in conditions
which could cause harm through normal operation,
known as hazards. Speciﬁcally, it has been observed
that IT leads to harm through failures, either of the
system itself, or by how it was integrated in healthcare
operations; this has sparked a discussion on safety of
digital healthcare.2-10 Although there is growing con-
sensus on the beneﬁts of health IT,11,12 there remains
the concern of whether we can justiﬁably have conﬁ-
dence in the operation of such services.
The bigger and more complex a service is, the more it
can exacerbate this concern, as there are more oppor-
tunities for something to ‘go wrong’. And when it does,
the path to harming a patient is often obscure, convo-
luted and inconspicuous, requiring targeted and sys-
tematic approaches to achieving safety. This challenge
is not unique to healthcare. Over the years, and moti-
vated by a number of accidents, there has been signiﬁ-
cant interest on behalf of operators, customers and
regulators in being able to capture and communicate
the justiﬁcation of placing assurance on the safe oper-
ation of a system. Achieving this requires understand-
ing the conditions during service operation that may
result in harm, and justiﬁcation that they have been
avoided or managed in a manner that will result in an
acceptably safe service.b
In many domains, providers of services are often
asked to make a case about the safety of that service,
known as a safety or assurance case. This entails a
structured argument explaining how the available
information allows someone to conﬁdently conclude
that a service is suﬃciently safe. Safety cases are con-
sidered as an eﬀective way of articulating and commu-
nicating a compelling safety justiﬁcation, and are often
stipulated as a requirement in many standards and
regulatory requirements, including healthcare. In the
UK, the safety of clinical IT systems is managed
through two standards, complementary to each other:
SCCI 0129 and SCCI 0160. SCCI 0160 (Clinical Risk
Management: its Application in the Deployment and Use
of Health IT Systems)13 focuses on risk management
relating to the deployment and use of health IT in digit-
ally enabled healthcare, whereas SCCI 0129 (Clinical
Risk Management: its Application in the Manufacture
of Health IT Systems)14 focuses on the application of
risk management to the manufacture of health IT. The
standards follow a similar philosophy to that of ISO
14971 Medical devices  Application of risk management
to medical devices, thereby maintaining a consistent
approach to risk management in the healthcare
domain. Safety cases have also been considered as a
means of contributing towards systematic and pro-
active management of safety in healthcare.15
This paper presents a framework, and its proof-of-
concept application, for producing the information
necessary for a skeleton safety case about a digitally
enabled service. Within its steps, the framework incorp-
orates a deviation-basedmethod for exploratory analysis
of a service. The framework described in the paper, can
facilitate the operator’s ability to comply with the safety
assurance requirements (stipulated in the standard).
However, the framework can be applied on its own, as
part of the safety assurance process of an organisation.
The paper uses a case study for proof-of-concept
application of the framework, focusing on the use of
IT systems in an accidents and emergencies (A&E) clin-
ical service (Figure 1), and motivated by the require-
ment of SCCI0160 to construct a safety case. It begins
with an overview of how understanding potential devi-
ations from intended operation can result in building a
causal picture of harm for a service. It follows with
explaining the main tenets of justiﬁably establishing
assurance in the safety of a service, as well as how sys-
tems analyses can contribute to this. The paper carries
on with the deﬁnition of a framework which can be
applied to a digitally enabled healthcare service,
aiming to produce and articulate the safety relevant
information and justiﬁcation. The description of each
of the stages of the framework comprises of (a) how it
contributes to safety assurance, (b) general guidelines
for its application, and (c) proof of concept using the
A&E digitally enabled scenario. The purpose of each
step is described in the ‘The Safety Justiﬁcation
Framework’ section, whereas guidance, along with
example application to the A&E case study, is described
in the section ‘Guidance and application of the frame-
work to an A&E services scenario’. Application of the
framework would facilitate operators of health IT to
comply with the mandatory SCCI 0160 standard, pro-
ducing the skeleton of a safety justiﬁcation of the ser-
vice, a requirement of the standard.
Understanding the contribution of deviation
analysis and safety cases to safety justification
A safety case explains why one should believe that an
oﬀered service or system is acceptably safe. Speciﬁcally,
in the healthcare context, a safety case explains how the
available evidence collected during the various phases
of the service creation (i.e. design, development and
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operation) justiﬁes assurance about management of the
hazards associated with that service.16-18 In the health-
care domain, two standards, mandatory in the UK,
speciﬁcally stipulate the provision of a safety case for
health IT systems, used in clinical services, as a means
to document safety assurance.13,14 A safety case consti-
tutes the information vessel for the necessary discourse
that will provide conﬁdence in the safety of a service.
A number of safety standards in various industries,
which aim to represent best practice, are imposed to
inﬂuence the appropriateness and consistency of the
safety-related activities in a domain. Compliance with
a standard will result in a suite of information-produc-
tion activities, assisting with safety justiﬁcation.
Usually, the rigour required by the prescribed
processes, in terms of number and depth of activities,
reﬂects the estimated criticality of the system (the more
rigorous a followed process is, the safer the system will
be). However, prescribing a set of processes relies on
that assumption, and does not always explicitly explain
how the identiﬁed hazards in a system have been dealt
with. This has resulted in a number of standards requir-
ing a system to be accompanied by a safety case, which
explicitly documents this explanation, based on the
information available about a system. The value of
creating a structured argument is to have the means
of capturing and communicating the rationale about
safety, to all involved stakeholders. This systematic
approach allows the argument to be reviewed for its
completeness and defensibility of claims throughout
the project, separating concerns for stakeholders, and
revealing any information gaps that may undermine the
safety justiﬁcation.
One of the prerequisites to justifying safety is ana-
lysis and understanding of how the constituent elem-
ents of a system may contribute to hazards. Among
other techniques, the safety analysis process includes
a family of methods, described as deviation-based ana-
lyses. Such techniques include Hazard and Operability
Studies (HAZOP),19 Failure Modes and Eﬀects
Analysis (FMEA) and Functional Hazard Analysis.20
Deviation analyses are exploratory approaches and are
used to methodically prompt each part of the system
(e.g. patient registration function) with candidate devi-
ations from intended behaviour, usually represented by
a guideword (e.g. omission). The analysis then focuses
on interpreting the deviation (i.e. patient will not be
registered in the system), examining its plausibility
and eﬀect, as well as its impact on the operation of
the entire system. Deviations considered to be plausible
are characterised as potential failure conditions, the
eﬀects of which will need to be explored. Although
HAZOP is recognised as being prevalent and useful in
many domains,21,22 the most prominent deviation-
based technique used in healthcare has been FMEA.
The use of FMEA in healthcare is considered to facili-
tate a systematic analysis of a service.23 FMEA has
been recommended by a number of patient safety
organisations: the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), as a means
Other services
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Figure 1. Overview of the A&E service and its health IT dependencies.
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for accreditation; the Institute for Healthcare
Improvement and the NHS National Patient Safety
Agency24 as a method in their risk management
framework; and the Institute for Safe Medication
Practices as a tool for safety analysis. Examples of
use of FMEA in healthcare include organ procurement
and transplantation,25 intravenous drug infusions26,27
and communication in emergency care.28 Between
2004 and 2008, FMEA was used as a method to
improve patient safety as part of the Safer Patients
Initiative.29 FMEA is seen as an approach to conduct
prospective safety analysis in healthcare (most notably
as a means of meeting the JCAHO LD.5.2 requirement
that asks for proactive analysis). FMEA is considered
as a useful technique in proactive safety analysis, par-
ticularly in the presence of increasingly complex health-
care services.26,30,31 Nevertheless, issues with its
reliability are also recognised, particularly variability
in results by diﬀerent teams. However, even in the pres-
ence of reliability issues, FMEA is recognised as being
eﬀective in engaging the stakeholders in analysis as well
as in identifying potential hazards.32
Identiﬁcation of the eﬀects (on safety) of non-
intended operation of a service (i.e. failures) will
result in understanding the conditions necessary for
safety signiﬁcant events (i.e. risk to the patient).
Achievement of safety requires management of these
conditions. Risk controls are introduced that will
either prevent these conditions, or mitigate their eﬀect
(thus breaking the causal chain to harm, or reducing its
severity). Justifying the safety of a service (i.e. making a
safety case) will eventually entail, among others, argu-
ments appealing to the eﬀectiveness of the introduced
risk controls. Stakeholders in charge of the safety case
should ideally argue that the end service, along with
any introduced controls, will result in acceptable safety.
The safety justification framework
Figure 2 presents the overview of the framework, with
its stages categorised according to how they can
inﬂuence the design of a servicec in terms of (a) require-
ments elicitation and concept deﬁnition, (b) detailed
speciﬁcation and design of the system (or service) and
(c) implementation and veriﬁcation of the service.
Table 1 summarises the input and output of each
step, capturing the information ﬂows during applica-
tion of the framework.
It is not expected that the framework will be used
once during the design of the system. Instead, iterative
application is expected, and steps of it can be reapplied
when new information about the service surfaces (e.g. a
new hazard, or a new version of an IT system used) to
revalidate the safety justiﬁcation. The framework can
Explore
credible
failures
Establish Requirements
elicitation and
conceptual definition
scope of
analysis
Examine
safety
significance
Verify
safety
controls
Implement
safety
controls
Identify Detailed
Implementation and
verification
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design of service
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Figure 2. Overview of the framework.
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also be applied for appraisal and safety justiﬁcation of
existing services, as is the case of this paper.
Step 1  Establish scope of analysis
Step 1 focuses on explicitly establishing the scope of the
clinical operation under analysis. It is important during
this stage to collect and organise all information avail-
able about the operation of the system. Relevant con-
textual information is necessary in order for the result
of the analysis to constitute a valid basis for safety-
related reasoning and decisions.33 In order for the pro-
cess to start there should be models of the service under
analysis, oﬀering a suﬃcient degree of representation of
its constituent elements (e.g. IT systems, people, pro-
cedures). The degree to which a model represents reality
is another crucial part of the analysis; if the model is
not realistic, then neither will the analysis represent
reality, resulting in conclusions that may be irrelevant.
It is advised that the analysis team includes domain
experts who will review the models. One concern at
this stage might be the lack of suﬃcient or acceptable
models. In such a case, a model of the system will need
to be created.
The analysis, design and implementation of many
systems and services are captured using a generic mod-
elling graphical representation language, such as the
Universal Modelling Language (UML),34 the
Business Process Modelling and Notation (BPMN)35-
38 or domain-speciﬁc languages.39 Modelling lan-
guages, such as UML and BPMN, are deﬁned in
their respective speciﬁcation documents, which explain
their basic elements, and provide the rules on how
these elements can be combined. Appropriate use of
modelling languages should conform to their respect-
ive speciﬁcation in order to provide a common means
of representing a system. In certain cases, the system
may be modelled using an ad-hoc language that may
not conform to a standard. This is not necessarily a
disadvantage if that ad-hoc language is used within an
organisation, as it may provide a representation means
familiar to an organisation without the need of a
learning curve for a new modelling language; it is cru-
cial in this case that the semantics, and any associated
notation used, are unambiguous to all stakeholders.
However, if the representation is used to communicate
with other organisations (e.g. with a health IT manu-
facturer) an ad-hoc representation may constitute a
barrier, and be the source of ambiguity. It is recom-
mended in such cases for an organisation to invest in
using a standardised modelling language such as UML
or BPMN.
A starting point for creating a model in the health IT
domain can be the description of clinical pathways,
which documents processes as well as resources
needed in delivering care.d;40,41 Simply ﬂagging this as
an issue to be resolved, without creating clear models of
the service, may hinder the ability of the stakeholders to
Table 1. Information flow between the framework steps.
Input Action Output
1 Service description documents
Related services and dependencies
Pathway documents
Modelling assumptions and specification
Establish scope of analysis Adopted service description documents
Modelling of gaps between experience
and documentation
Interfaces of services
2 Models and documentation for the entire service
Failure condition guidewords
Guidance for specific deviation analysis method used
(e.g. clinical FMEA, generic HAZOP etc.)
Identify credible failures List of credible failure conditions
Effects of credible failure conditions
Known circumstances leading to failures
3 Credible failures and their effects
Existing hazard list or hazard log
Examine safety significance Relationship of failures to hazards
Updated hazards list
4 Updated hazards list
List of failure conditions
Identify safety controls List of safety controls
Justification of suitability and effectiveness
of each control
5 List of safety controls
Justification of suitability and effectiveness
of each control
Implement safety controls Documentation and specification of safety controls
List of actions and ownership of safety
controls implementation
6 Updated hazards list
Justification of suitability and effectiveness
of each control
Documentation and specification of safety controls
Verify safety controls Evidence types for each control
Assessment of the relevance of existing evidence
Plan for generation of evidence
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understand potential eﬀects of decisions that will be
taken on other ‘neighbouring’ services. For example,
the ability of stakeholders to identify the eﬀects of a
failure condition to the wider service. Failure condi-
tions at one part of the system may propagate to
others, and result in respective (i.e. referring to the
latter systems) safety requirements.42,43
Step 2  Explore credible failures
Step 2 identiﬁes potential deviations from intended
operation, which could result in unwanted eﬀects.
Deviations always consist of a part of the service (e.g.
a task) and a guideword that suggests the deviation
with which the service part is prompted (e.g. ‘prescrip-
tion order’þ ’wrong’). The guidewords used in these
methods provide structure to the analysis, as they
guide the analysts through a list of failures commonly
aﬀecting safety. This step allows us to identify
conditions about the service with a signiﬁcant eﬀect,
thus laying the foundation for building a failure
oriented picture. In conjunction with the next step, ana-
lysts are then able to understand how the various con-
ditions will contribute to the identiﬁed hazards, or
identify new ones; also, this oﬀers the opportunity to
associate the failure conditions with severity and likeli-
hood, both being constituent attributes of risk, hence
transforming the failure conditions picture into a safety
picture. Ultimately, it is these failures that stakeholders
will manage by specifying safety-related service require-
ments (describing controls), which will either prevent
them, reduce their likelihood of occurrence or reduce
the severity of their eﬀect. Once a deviation is con-
sidered credible, the analysts will investigate potential
causes and the consequences. In addition to the
exploratory aspect, analysts have the opportunity to
incorporate feedback from reporting as well as tacit
experience by discussing known causes.
Step 3  Examine safety significance
Step 3 identiﬁes the signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of the
identiﬁed failures, by evaluating their contribution to
risk. Hazards are conditions of the system which,
through normal operation, may result in accidents. It
is the hazards in a system that may result in adverse
eﬀects to the patient (e.g. injury or death). Safety of a
system is achieved by eliminating, or managing, the
likelihood and/or severity (risk) of hazards. Achieving
this requires understanding of the failures of the system
that may constitute the causes of the identiﬁed hazards.
Risk is the concept that we use to capture the impact of
a hazard on safety, and consists of identiﬁcation of the
expected likelihood and severity (of the outcome) of a
hazard. Risk assessment of the hazards is necessary in
order to understand the contribution of each hazard to
overall safety in terms of likelihood and severity.
Step 4  Identify safety (risk) controls
Until step 4, the framework focuses on understanding
the intended operation of the system, possible and
plausible failures, as well as what these failures mean
in terms of safety. However, starting with this step the
focus moves on to how we can design the system to
prevent these failures, or mitigate their eﬀects, as well
as how this can be achieved whilst capturing the ration-
ale, which will ultimately result in conﬁdence about
both the eﬀectiveness of the controls and their correct
implementation. This step prompts understanding of
the existing means of managing the hazards, and sug-
gesting new ones if considered necessary. Controls can
be introduced at various levels of the operation of the
system, and can be technical, procedural, or even
organisational (e.g. training and policy), and be
owned by both the operator and the manufacturer.
For example, risk controls can include: (a) require-
ments for implementation of a particular safety-related
feature in a subsystem (e.g. sanity check of prescribed
dose), (b) a requirement that the subsystem will behave
in a particular way (e.g. patient list will update every 10
seconds), (c) in-house implementation of a health IT
(safety) function, (d) introduction of procedures (e.g.
sanity review of drug by nurses before administration),
and (e) organisation structure and policy (e.g. periodic
training of personnel).
Figure 3 illustrates how the safety controls will
provide barriers to the hazard causal chain, preventing
a failure from manifesting into one (hazard). The
prescription guidance aims to minimise a prescription
mistake in the ﬁrst place, by making sure that clin-
icians can access guidance when needed. The elec-
tronic alert function and the review of the
prescription by another clinician attempt to catch
the mistake and mitigate its eﬀects. Thus, in this
case, all three safety controls will need to not work
together in order for a failure to initially present and
develop into a hazard. In certain cases, the same
safety control will be used for multiple failures; in
this case, review of the prescription is a control to
both DS7.2 and DS7.6 (see Table 6).
Step 5  Implement safety controls
Intention to implement a safety control should not be
taken as evidence of its implementation. Step 5 has
been designed to reinforce the link between safety-
related identiﬁed actions and the management process
of the service, including management of the implemen-
tation of the risk controls. Following identiﬁcation and
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justiﬁcation of appropriate controls, practitioners of
the method will need to inquire about their actual
implementation. This step focuses on documenting
actions, and action ownership that needs to be taken
to implement the safety controls. For example, consider
the controls illustrated in Figure 3. Implementation of
the review by a clinician control will involve introduc-
tion and documentation of the review in the operating
procedures of the organisation, as well as potential
training of the aﬀected staﬀ. Implementation of the
electronic alert function control will involve liaising
with the manufacturer of the relevant IT system, to
request the required functionality.
Safety controls that will be implemented by the oper-
ating organisation are expected to be speciﬁed by some-
one with in-depth knowledge of the healthcare service,
whereas the ones that will be implemented as technical
solutions may be implemented either in-house or out-
sourced to a manufacturer. The latter may involve
numerous considerations, in addition to the described
functionality, that may aﬀect safety. For example, the
user interface of the electronic alert function may itself
result in harm if not designed appropriately (e.g. a warn-
ing pop-up window that can be dismissed accidentally).
Other considerations may include the availability of the
function (e.g. the IT system oﬀering the electronic alert
function being oﬄine); the reliability of the function
(e.g. the function not detecting a wrong dosage or
dose); functional correctness (e.g. the wrong dosage
quantities to be programmed in the function); fault tol-
erance of the function (e.g. the alert function to be avail-
able even when there is a fault with an IT system); and
issues such as the development quality of the function
(e.g. the testing results of the function). Understanding
the safety-related requirements that will need to be met
by another organisation (e.g. health IT manufacturer) is
crucial to safety justiﬁcation of a service, and can con-
stitute a safety as well as a business risk.44
In order for the operator to be in a position to
demonstrate acceptable safety, evidence will need to
be provided that substantiates the justiﬁcation of the
appropriateness and correct implementation of the
hazard/failure controls. For example, deciding that a
dosage sanity check control will contribute towards
controlling a particular hazard implies intent, and not
conﬁrmation that the function exists and operates as
required.
Step 6  Verify safety controls
Without evidence, a safety justiﬁcation cannot be con-
ﬁdently supported, but only assumed. Step 6 focuses on
the evidence that is required to support the risk controls
that have been decided in the previous step. This step
should focus on understanding: (a) the essence of what
it is that will be claimed in the ﬁnal justiﬁcation
(e.g. provision of function, a particular operational
characteristic such as performance), (b) the types of
evidence needed to support the relevant claims, and
(c) the explanation of how the available evidence war-
rants the belief to the claim it supports. The latter is an
important part of this step, as often stakeholders, due
to their proximity to the operation of the system, may
assume logical inferences  not depicted in the safety
explanation/argument  which others may not be able
to clearly understand. What would be a good combin-
ation of evidence to support a claim is not necessarily
what is available, or what has been planned to be pro-
duced. An inquiry into the suﬃciency of available evi-
dence is necessary, to explicitly identify gaps between
expectation of support of a claim and availability of
information constituting evidence. Upon identiﬁcation
of gaps, it is important for the processes that will
remedy the situation to be identiﬁed, planned, and
assigned to an owner who will see the process through.
Internal and external audit to an organisation is a
common means to evaluate suitability and suﬃciency
of collected evidence. Third party audit allows a degree
of independence that will evaluate available evidence
without the conﬁrmation bias of those who were
involved in designing the service. It should be noted
though, that (particularly external) audit as an
Other potential
DS7.2 Antibiotic
mistake during
prescription
Available prescription
H
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D
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Review by clinicianfunction
Other failures
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Figure 3. Risk controls introduced to the system to intervene, preventing failures resulting in harm to the patient.
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improvement process ﬂourishes in a deﬁned environ-
ment, often created by regulation, where feedback is
oﬀered and used constructively to improve safety, and
not as a blame exercise.
Guidance and application of the framework to
an A&E services scenario
The described framework was applied to a case study
for an A&E clinical service, which has allowed for the
framework’s evaluation and optimisation. Application
of the framework, along with further guidance, is given
in the following sections.
Step 1  A&E service definition
The basic considerations included by a model should at
minimum include: (a) the main activities (e.g. steps of a
pathway), (b) the elements or groups of elements that
contribute to each step of the service (e.g. systems, sub-
systems, components, people), (c) the information
exchanged between each step of the service and (d)
among the elements contributing to each step, as well
as (e) the interfaces of the service under analysis with
other services.
Table 2 and Figure 1 summarise the elements of the
A&E service under analysis. Table 2 presents the main
events in the A&E service and the people roles respon-
sible for each event.
In this case, the service is modelled in a tabular
format by separating aspects of the service (e.g. roles
table, activities table). Non-graphical approaches to
modelling systems are not uncommon in certain
domains. However, it is important to accompany all
documents with a deﬁnition of the semantics of the
words (e.g. action) used, as often the interpretation of
the semantics of a word may be diﬀerent to the aspects
that are intended to be modelled. Models created using
diﬀerent modelling approaches (e.g. graphical and text
based) can be superimposed as a means of verifying the
validity of the models. If one of the two approaches is
considered as imprecise, then this may constitute evi-
dence of lack of understanding of the service, whereas if
all elements in one model can be traced clearly to the
other representation, this is a good indication that the
service is well understood, and that the modelling
means are well deﬁned. It is advisable that all represen-
tations (of the same service) are explored and developed
to the extent where all are in agreement.
Step 2  A&E deviations definition
The description in this paper presents a generic meth-
odology of applying deviation analysis derived from
previous work of the authors;43 nevertheless, it should
be noted that other well-deﬁned methods can be used
instead in this step, such as HAZOP and healthcare
FMEA. The output of this part of the method is
shown in columns 18 of Table 5 (columns 9 and 10
are populated by the next step of the method). Table 5
presents an extract from the deviation analysis method
applied to elements of the A&E pathway.
Table 3 suggests a set of guidewords along with their
interpretation as a starting point. The proposed set
should not preclude assessing the relevance of the
guidewords. Practitioners of this method are advised
to consider evaluating the suggested guidewords, as
well as to assess the suitability of guidewords from
other domains. Traditional (stricter) deviation analyses
distinguish between guidewords representing deviations
of system attributes, from the causes that may result in
this deviation. However, a problem with this is that it
requires a high degree of familiarity of the practitioners,
with the relative merits and limitations of each method,
as well as usually requiring a well-deﬁned system
model, not always compatible with how clinical services
are documented in reality. For the purpose of this
method, guidewords should be seen as prompts that
will catalyse identiﬁcation of safety signiﬁcant failures.e
Furthermore, if during application of the guidewords a
type of failure is repetitively noticed, but not repre-
sented clearly by one of the guidewords (e.g. during
application of the guideword other), then analysts
may choose to update the guideword list with a new
guideword explicitly representing this type of failure.
Actively monitoring and updating the set of guide-
words will increase conﬁdence in the exhaustiveness
of the method, as it will cover both the most represen-
tative failures and also explore the applicability of
Table 2. Roles and events in the A&E.
Role Event
A&E: Reception Patient arrives with escort
Patient registered at reception
A&E: Triage Patient called through for triage assessment
Allergies checked and documented
A&E: Consultant FBC & X-ray requested and carried out
A&E: Nurse Dr reviews X-ray report & assesses patient
A&E: Junior doctor Wound sutured
A&E: Nurse Refer to on-call team
Prescribes antibiotic
Refers to the on-take team
Patient discharged from A&E
A&E: Doctor Bed allocated on admissions ward and patient
8 DIGITAL HEALTH
failures from other domains. Finally, it should be noted
that over-specifying guidewords may be counter-pro-
ductive for the method, as it will over-prescribe the
expected failures, hindering brainstorming, which is
important at this stage.
Once a deviation is considered credible (see Table 5)
the analysts will investigate potential causes and its
potential consequences. Consequences should be
described both in terms of what the deviation ‘means’
for the system element (local eﬀects), as well as in terms
of how it aﬀects the entire system (system contribution).
Understanding a deviation from a local viewpoint is
always more straightforward than understanding its
eﬀects in the entire system, which entails the analysts
examining propagation of the eﬀects (and possibly
transformation to other types of failures). A clear
model, with suﬃcient resolution of the service, is crucial
to establish traceability of the eﬀects of a failure con-
dition to the entire service (Step 1 of the framework).
The challenge of understanding service-wide eﬀects is
further exacerbated by the dynamic and adaptive
nature of clinical services. It is expected that the
model of the service will include known variability.
Most modelling languages (e.g. UML) provide the con-
structs to create models capturing a dynamic and adap-
tive service. Often, a deviation will have already been
experienced by stakeholders who may have ‘patched’
the problem by intuitively adjusting their practice.
Known circumstances should be recorded when pos-
sible, also explaining the source of this explanation
(e.g. an incident recording system), as this will then
help evaluate the eﬀectiveness of risk controls in step
6 of the framework.
In addition, the deviation table should always con-
tain the source of the system description, as well as the
document that captures all rationale generated for each
deviation. This should include justiﬁcation for any devi-
ations that are considered implausible. Finally, it is
expected that the team responsible for performing this
process may often not have access to suﬃcient infor-
mation to determine aspects of a deviation (e.g. its
plausibility or eﬀects); the owner of the safety analysis
process should take action to gather the required infor-
mation and ensure that all deviations have been con-
clusively examined by the end of the entire process.
Step 3  A&E deviations credibility assessment
and hazard identification
Upon identiﬁcation of a credible deviation (i.e. failure
conditions), its eﬀects need to be understood and, if
they are considered safety related, to be associated
with a hazard (HazID column in Table 5). Hazards
can be identiﬁed by (a) previous experience, (b) similar
projects, (c) brainstorming and (d) systematic analysis.
Although the approach presented in this paper falls
within the category of systematic analysis, other
sources should not be discounted, and should be used
to complete the analysis. The contribution of this
method to identifying new hazards is achieved by
Table 3. Suggested guidewords to begin deviation-based analysis.
Guideword Interpretation Guideword Interpretation
Omission Something missing when expected Commission Something present when not expected
Early Something happening earlier than expected Late Something happening later than expected
Sequence Something happening out of sequence (when it
matters)
Value Wrong value in a piece of information
Lapse A person not doing something that they were sup-
posed to
Slip A person doing something wrong accidentally
Mistake A person doing something wrong intentionally
(unaware that it is wrong  i.e. not malicious)
Access Someone or something have unintended access to
resources or data
More Unintended increment in the quantity of an attribute
of a system element (N.B. needs description of the
attribute and its scale)
Less Unintended decrement in the quantity of an attribute
of a system element (N.B. needs description of the
attribute and its scale)
Overload Overloading a system or person (can also be thought
of as a specific case of ‘more’)
Other Generic guideword to encourage free discussion
about something going wrong but not covered by
the suggested guidewords
Wrong A generic guideword capturing something wrong
happening in the system
Violation
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realising deviations with safety-related consequences
that cannot be associated with any of the existing ones.
If a failure condition results in a safety-related eﬀect, but
cannot be associated with an existing hazard, then intro-
duction of a new hazard may be appropriate. In con-
trast, if the eﬀects of a failure condition can be related to
an existing hazard, then that failure condition is part of
the causal chain of that (known) hazard.
An assessment of severity categorisation of each
hazard has been included for the purpose of complete-
ness of the example, following the guidance in the SCCI
0160, which recommends a risk framework.
However, guidance on risk assessment is not in the
scope of this paper; for this, risk assessment frame-
works such as one from the NHS National Patient
Safety Agency24 can be used. It is expected that organ-
isations will have a local implementation of such risk
assessment frameworks. This will also include a process
for reconciling diﬀerent views among the stakeholders
performing risk assessment (e.g. independent peer
review). It is important that when diﬀerent standards
are used, all stakeholders are clear on what each clas-
siﬁcation means in operational terms (e.g. what is the
interpretation of probable likelihood). Possible diﬀer-
ences on interpretation should not be left unresolved
as they may result in conﬂicting hazard assessments.
Table 4 provides the list of identiﬁed hazards ultimately
identiﬁed using the framework, along with their sever-
ity.f If the framework is used as a means to audit an
existing service, the process should conﬁrm existing
hazards, as well as that all known paths from failures
to harm have been managed.
Step 4  A&E safety controls
Table 6 provides an extract of the analysis summarising
the controls related to the contribution of failures
DS7.2 and DS7.6 to hazards H2 and H3. To help
with brainstorming and elicitation of the failure con-
trols, the table provides three categories of safety con-
trols, common to safety engineering, which are
prevention, mitigation and detection of the failure.
The prescription guidance aims to minimise a prescrip-
tion mistake in the ﬁrst place, by making sure that clin-
icians can access guidance when needed. The electronic
alert function and the review of the prescription by
another clinician attempt to catch the mistake and miti-
gate its eﬀects. In this case, all three risk controls will
need to not work in order for a failure to develop into a
hazard. In certain cases, the same safety control may be
used for multiple failures; for example, in this case
review of the prescription is a control to both DS7.2
and DS7.6.
At this stage, the stakeholders of the analysis can
start thinking about the exact way in which the controls
will operate, and specify the details of these functions in
the service; for example, how the prescription guidance
will be provided, whether clinicians will be trained to
use it, and whether they will have suﬃcient time to use
this control appropriately. All these concerns will then
be veriﬁed in the following steps of the method, by
looking for data conﬁrming that clinicians actually
use the guidance, or any counter-evidence that they
are not, such as reports from staﬀ. If data collected
during veriﬁcation is not suﬃcient to warrant the ver-
acity of the claims about the safety controls, then the
safety analysts may plan to collect more data, or rede-
sign the controls in a more suitable way. This kind of
interaction is an example of how the framework will
facilitate and guide the safety evidence discovery
process.
Safety controls that will be implemented by the oper-
ating organisation will be speciﬁed by the clinicians,
whereas the ones that will be implemented by the
manufacturer of IT (or other systems) may be imple-
mented either in-house or outsourced to a manufac-
turer. Figure 4 shows an overview of the issues of an
IT-implemented function that may be inﬂuenced by the
safety analysis. Understanding the safety-related
requirements that will be discharged to another organ-
isation (e.g. health IT manufacturer) is crucial to safety
justiﬁcation of a service, and can constitute a safety as
well as a business risk.44
Step 5  Tracking A&E safety control
implementation
Implementation of the safety controls should be
tracked and conﬁrmed. This can be done using ‘trad-
itional’ project management techniques such task lists
and task tables. The task should contain the necessary
information for the person in charge of safety to be able
Table 4. Identified hazards based on application of the
framework.
HazID Hazard Severity
H1 Patient not treated Major
H2 Patient treated with delay Major
H3 Incorrect patient treatment Considerable
H4 Introduction of wrong data
to patient record
Significant
H5 Unnecessary patient harm/injury
during treatment
Considerable
H6 Patient discomfort Minor
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to check progress at any point. This will contribute
towards checking for potential delays either due to
resource allocation or due to diﬃculty producing the
necessary information. If the latter is the case, this may
constitute a risk for the safety justiﬁcation of the ser-
vice. For example, if a health IT subcontractor cannot
produce evidence for the required behaviour of the
medicine administration function, which is a safety con-
trol managing a risk, then alternative means of justiﬁ-
cation should be considered. Even if the function is
implemented, not being in a position to convincingly
argue about the required behaviour will result in a
valid but unsubstantiated or unconvincing justiﬁcation.
Figure 5 illustrates an example of how the annotations
on the graphical representation of the argument, (see
the ‘Visualising the justiﬁcation synthesis’ section of the
paper), can be used to track information about imple-
mentation. In this case, the annotations inform that the
clinical safety oﬃcer, who is the coordinator of the
overall safety case, is also responsible for identifying
how failure DS7.2 can been addressed, which involves
identiﬁcation of suitable safety controls. This is some-
thing that would ideally involve multiple stakeholders,
depending on the type of the control, hence the owner
of this claim will need to produce the decisions from the
relevant meetings. In this example, the clinical safety
oﬃcer is the most suitable role for this responsibility,g
as according to SCCI 0160 that stipulates the role, they
are tasked with this kind of coordination.
Step 6  A&E safety controls evidence collation
An extract of the evidence used for the A&E scenario,
namely evidence for controls relating to DS7.2 and
DS7.5, is shown in Table 6. For example, evidence
for the implementation of the review process can be
found in the documentation of the operating proced-
ures, demonstrating that the process has actually been
introduced. For IT-based controls such as the elec-
tronic alert function, suitable evidence may be the
documentation of the function, as well as references
to the quality assurance of the manufacturer who devel-
oped the function. When identifying evidence, its
source should also be deﬁned, such as testing reports,
system speciﬁcations and other studies. In this case, the
identiﬁed evidence can be found in the training booklet,
the system speciﬁcation, and the testing scripts and
results of the prescription system. As with the rest of
the safety case, annotations indicate the person, role or
team responsible for their maintenance and update.
Visualising the justification synthesis
The reasoning behind the claims in a safety case can
often be complex, reﬂecting the complexity of theTa
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service itself. Figure 6 visualises the justiﬁcation that
argues identiﬁcation and management of the failure
conditions that have been identiﬁed as potential
causes of hazards.
Use of free text to capture the argument often results
in arguments that are diﬃcult to follow, thus making
the case (more) unclear and incomprehensible. It is
believed that supporting text by capturing parts of the
safety case in a graphical format contributes towards
the clarity of the safety case. The Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) is a language containing all the neces-
sary concepts to capture an argument in a structured
format. GSN comes with a graphical notation and a
method that can be used to facilitate the construction
of an argument.
Figure 6h illustrates a basic argument explaining
how the management of the identiﬁed hazards allows
assurance for the acceptable safety of an A&E service,
using the GSN. The top-level claim of the argument,
which also constitutes the overall position that we
would like to communicate, is about the acceptable
safety of the A&E service. This claim is also associated
with two placeholders pointing to contextual informa-
tion about how the A&E service is designed, as well as
any safety targets for the service that may be applicable,
either qualitative (e.g. introducing controls for all haz-
ards) or quantitative (e.g. previous or desired risk
levels). The strategy that follows explains that the
claim will be supported by making an argument
about managing the identiﬁed hazards, stated in the
following claim (A&E hazards have been acceptably
addressed). That last claim is stated in the context of
a reference to the hazard log that will provide the
source of the hazards for the service. At this point the
argument also makes a reference to an argument
module (i.e. a self-contained argument), which will
explain why we believe that the hazard log is complete;
however, this is outside the scope of the actual hazard
management argument (and outside the scope of this
paper) and thus has been packaged separately.i A claim
about addressing each one of the identiﬁed hazards is
made. A strategy below the claim about addressing
Hazard 2 explains that the argument will be further
developed by addressing the contributing failures to
the hazard, which have been identiﬁed during the
second and third stages of the framework (i.e. deviation
analysis).
Results
In terms of provision of the clinical service, the frame-
work has provided a valuable means of structuring the
information collection processes. It oﬀers interfaces
with management of the various tasks, the input of
which is necessary for the safety case. Creating a struc-
tured safety justiﬁcation resulted in understanding of
what the safety analyses need to provide in terms of
information in order to create a convincing argument,
and facilitated planning of these activities. Creation of
a graphically supported safety case to articulate the
argument allowed for clear communication of the over-
arching safety strategy of the organisation.
Deviation All contributingfailures have
been addressed
{Failure X} has
been addressed
Owner:  A.B.C.
Project task ID: 1.5.3
Role:  Clinical safety officer
Status:  Completed
Timescale:  End of interim safety review
Deliverables:  Safety review meeting minutes
Suitability:  Clinical safety officer responsible
for coordination and consensus of clinical
stakeholders for safety controls
DS7.6 has been
addressed
DS7.2 has been
addressed
analysis
Figure 5. Ownership allocation, and management information
annotation, of safety justification components.
Functional
Fault
Development
quality
Appropriate
UI
Electronic alert function
tolerance
correctness
Functional
availability
Functional
reliability
Figure 4. Safety analysis will reveal requirements for health IT
functions, from numerous points of view.
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The inherent thoroughness of the deviation-based
analysis was beneﬁcial towards conﬁdence that all oper-
ational aspects have been considered. The exercise
resulted in identiﬁcation of a set hazards that was in
accordance with the hazards expected to be found in a
real A&E service. There was additional value provided
by the framework, of mapping how the various day-to-
day failures can result in these hazards, and enabling
Step 1
Step 2
Step 4
& Step 5
Step 5
& Step 6
Step 6
Step 3
Definition of the
Deviation
analysis
A&E pathway
Hazard log
A&E pathway is
acceptably safe
Argument over
pathway
hazards
Argument over
hazard
contributors
Argument over
the identified
controls
All contributing
failures have
been addressed
DS7.6 has been
addressed
DS7.2 has been
addressed
Hazards have
been
exhaustively
identified
Failure
prevention has
been
implemented
Prescription system safety case
Spec
Test
Audit
Data
Dosage fields are 
mandated in order
to complete
prescription
Dosage fields are 
mandated in order
to complete
prescription
Clinician review for
appropriateness of
antibiotic
Safety
controls
specification
A&E operation
procedures
Often the safety case will
reference parts of the safety
case provided by the
manufacturer
Failure
mitigation has
been
implemented
Controls result
in acceptable
safety
Hazard  1 has
been acceptably
addressed
Hazard  2 has
been acceptably
addressed
{Hazard X} has
been acceptably
addresed
{Failure X} has
been addresed
E&A Hazards 
have been
acceptably
addressed
Safety
acceptability
criteria
Figure 6. Graphical Representation of the Hazard Argument using GSN (notation assumptions: rectangles: claims, rounded rectangles:
contextual information, parallelograms: strategies, circles: evidence, rectangle with smaller rectangle on top left denotes a separate
argument (module), diamond: claim to be supported, arrows: inferences).
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a systematic review and justiﬁcation (backed by evi-
dence) of safety controls. The exercise allowed ﬂagging
of the information that needed to be provided by rep-
resentatives from each role (e.g. doctors, nurses, IT
contractors) contributing to the service, eliciting tacit
expertise that would otherwise have remained con-
cealed, or would have been replaced by assumptions.j
The steps of the framework identiﬁed numerous depen-
dencies between the safety justiﬁcation process (and the
safety oﬃcer responsible for it) and clinical as well ICT
staﬀ within the organisation. Clinical and ICT staﬀ
dependencies included contribution to the analyses
based on their expertise, as well as provision of infor-
mation that can be used to understand the service, or as
evidence to support the safety justiﬁcation. Finally,
application of the framework resulted in clear alloca-
tion of ownership of the elements that constitute the
justiﬁcation (e.g. safety controls, deviation analysis, evi-
dence) to speciﬁc stakeholders such as the clinical oﬃ-
cer, ICT staﬀ and ward directors, thus documenting the
responsibility of each stakeholder group towards safety
(e.g. provision of IT function).
Discussion and conclusions
The application of the framework to the A&E scenario
was evaluated based on the authors’ expert opinion,
from the perspective of a service owner, a regulator
and an auditor.k From a clinical operator’s point of
view, constructing a safety case allows the explicit ref-
erence of all risk controls in place, along with any
procedures and evidence of their operation. From a
regulator’s and auditor’s viewpoint, application of
the framework allows clear association of safety con-
trols and hazards for which they are intended, high-
lighting the rationale, the speciﬁcation of the controls,
and evidence for their implementation. One downside
of using a graphical notation is the resources needed to
train personnel to use it, although this is considered to
be few by comparison with the entire organisation’s
resources for safety. Deviation analyses are inherently
subjective, as the system stakeholders interpret the fail-
ure communicated by a deviation, as well as its eﬀect.
Depending on the experience of the stakeholders, they
may capture divergent interpretations, which would
need to be resolved and agreed. The obvious downside
to this is the increased resources that are needed to
disambiguate the eﬀect of the deviations. However,
this can also be seen as a strength of the approach,
as this kind of discrepancies of expectations among
stakeholders may undermine conﬁdence in the safety
of the service, if undetected. The deviation analysis
approach is very suitable to understanding the causal
chains to harm, from unintended operation, in pro-
active analysis. Other techniques may also be
applicable, which can provide the same information
ﬂow, as suggested by Table.1. The framework has
been particularly useful to highlight the dependencies
of information, necessary for the safety justiﬁcation,
between ICT staﬀ, clinical staﬀ and the clinical
safety oﬃcer, responsible for the overall coordination
of the safety activities. Furthermore, the framework
identiﬁed dependencies of the operator organisation
on the manufacturer, which may become areas of busi-
ness risk if not addressed at the appropriate time.
Applicability of the framework goes beyond the
scope of IT-based healthcare services, and it can be
applied to paper-based systems. In this case, functions
performed by IT, such as storage and processing, are
performed by other elements of the system (e.g. paper-
based archives and person-based processing).
Nevertheless, the increasing use of health IT in health-
care has contributed to the complexity of services. IT
also aﬀects the way safety can be achieved; risk controls
can be introduced as IT functions, technical IT failures
can potentially cause harm to patients, and the continu-
ous evolution of IT technologies oﬀers little time for an
in-depth understanding of the technologies, requiring
the operational and clinical stakeholders to be able to
work closer and in a structured and eﬀective way with
the technical stakeholders. Although many of the
safety-related challenges already existed, health IT has
exacerbated the need for a systematic, proactive ana-
lysis. This need is also seen by the increasing attention
on safety of health IT, such as the SCCI standards and
their requirements for a safety case, which was the
motivation for this work.
Although the approach has been considered very
useful for eliciting failures, risk controls, and establish-
ing justiﬁcations, there are certain limitations.
Application of the framework needs clear ownership;
a stakeholder who is responsible for the completeness
and correctness of the process, with the necessary
authority to manage the relevant activities described
in the framework. Application of the framework in
the context of the SCCI standard 0129 and 0160
would not be challenged by this, as these standards
stipulate the role of the clinical safety oﬃce having
the ownership of the process. Although it is expected
that most organisations will have a distinct safety role,
this should not be taken as granted. Another limitation
(and also a common misconception about safety cases)
is that application of framework will not necessarily
make the service justiﬁably safe. It provides the neces-
sary information and structure for a proactive analysis,
but ultimately, safety assurance will depend upon cor-
rect application of the steps, acting upon the ﬁndings,
and making a convincing argument.
The framework can be seen as a generic and system-
atic approach to generating information that, in the
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authors’ view, should constitute the minimum expected
to be found in safety justiﬁcation of any service.
Application of the framework performed strongly in
enabling a clear understanding of how every piece of
information produced contributed to the justiﬁcation
of the service; for example, how evidence about the cor-
rectness of an IT function oﬀered by the manufacturer
allows the operator (healthcare organisation) to have
conﬁdence in the safe operation of the IT system, and
in extension the entire service. This is achieved by under-
standing the relationships between information, andhow
they are all assembled into one coherent argument about
the entire service.Nevertheless, a dynamic system such as
a healthcare service is expected to undergo numerous
changes, whichmay undermine the relevance of the iden-
tiﬁed conditions, as well as the resultant justiﬁcation
(safety case). It is important for the owner of a safety
case to establish the processes for continuous monitor-
ing, and update the produced information and justiﬁca-
tion, according to changes. Updating should be
approached with the same systematic manner, following
the traceability oﬀered by the framework.
The frameworkused in the case studywasdesigned for
use in the healthcare domain, based on the experience of
the authors. It combines a number of techniques and
methods used in safety in a way that is considered intui-
tive for potential users. The framework underwent
adjustments based on the ﬁndings of the A&E scenario
in order to be optimised for healthcare. Although all
steps are expected to be part of safety analyses processes
in all domains, they are often stipulated as part of regu-
lation or an applicable standard. In healthcare, such
standards are not that well known, resulting in the need
for some aspects of the safety analysis to be built in the
framework, as suggested by this paper. For example, step
1, that considers the deﬁnition of the service, was added
to the framework, as the authors have experienced a lack
of structured and clear description (i.e. models) to be a
common barrier for structured safety analysis in health-
care. In other domains (suchas aerospace and theprocess
industry) deﬁnition of the service is guided by other asso-
ciated standards, and is not always an integral part of the
actual safety analysis process.
The authors believe, basedon their experience, that the
framework is applicable to any healthcare service, or clin-
ical setting. The framework was designed based on the
information necessary to establish any safety case, rather
than on the needs of speciﬁc case study. The A&E service
was seen as a complex, socio-technical system, consisting
of numerous elements collaborating in an intended
manner to oﬀer the required functionality. It includes
generalised (safety) principles that have been used repeat-
edly in multiple domains. However, evaluation of the
degree of generalisation of the frameworkwas considered
as beyond the scope of this work, and given the limitation
of applying the framework only on the A&E case study,
this claim should be taken as a ﬁrm belief of the authors
rather than as a conclusion of this work.
Concluding, the authors believe that applying the
process described in this paper will provide a useful
foundation for a concrete and proactive safety discus-
sion, analysis and justiﬁcation process.
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Notes
a. Harm in the context of this paper implies risks to which patients
are exposed due to the operation of the service they use, and
not the inherent risk of a disease. This may, for example,
include harm caused by the system, or inefficient treatment.
The terms adverse event, e-iatrogenesis, sentinel event, safety
incident, accident are considered synonymous to harm, which is
interpreted as compromise of the safety of a patient.
b. The authors use the terms system and service interchangeably
in this paper, implying that a service is an intended operation of
a designed assembly (i.e. system).
c. This classification can be applied to both new and existing ser-
vices; for the latter it takes the function of appraisal and
improvement of the intended outcomes.
d. Attention should be paid when using pathway documents as there
is a significant variation between organisations on how pathways
are document and therefore variable suitability as a source.
e. More about the pedigree of the deviation-based part of the
method in Despotou.43
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f. Likelihood of the hazards was not addressed in the exercise, as
this exercise focused on verification of a hazard list based on
experience, and identification of the conditions that lead to
them. Likelihood assessment would need input from quantitative
data (i.e. reporting) or expert opinion (e.g. ‘‘in my opinion I see
this failure a few times a week’’), not available to this proof-of-
concept application.
g. The authors have adopted the term clinical safety officer as
suggested in SCCI 0160. Although the specific term may not
be used in all organisations, it is expected that all organisations
performing even rudimentary safety analysis will have a role
that will fit the description of a clinical safety officer as stipu-
lated in SCCI 0160.
h. A graphical representation is one of the ways a safety case can
be captured. Regardless of the means of capturing a safety case
the concepts remain the same. The authors have applied
‘loosely’ the GSN notation, as explanation of the notation is
outside the scope of the paper. The GSN standard, which fully
defines the notation can be found at http://www.goalstructur-
ingnotation.info.
i. It is expected that a more comprehensive safety case would
include elaboration of this argument.
j. A number of TBDs in the tables indicate the need to unearth
more expert knowledge. In a large-scale case study of the actual
service, identification of an information vacuum would have
raised a task to consult the relevant experts within the organ-
isation, or activities, aiming to generate the missing
information.
k. The authors collectively have expertise in all of these roles.
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